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Introduction
It has now been more than a decade since Korean1 popular culture has 
made a massive inroad into East Asia and, subsequently, other Asian 
countries. The mass media and concerned scholars have given the appellation 
of “Korean Wave” (Hallyu in Korean) to such Korean cultural products as 
television dramas, popular music, and movies becoming so popular in these 
countries.2 Since the mid-1990s, Korean popular culture has spread over the 
pan ethnic-Chinese countries including China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and 
Singapore at first, then over such Southeast Asian countries as Vietnam, 
Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia, followed by Mongolia, Japan, and even 
beyond East Asia.3 The Hallyu boom in Japan was ignited by a 2004 television 
drama, Winter Sonata, and has since drawn a great deal of scholarly attention, 
because Japan is the first modernized or Westernized country in Asia and 
Japanese popular culture has been dominant in many East Asian countries 
for several decades. Korea is not an exception; its popular culture has also 
been strongly influenced by Japanese pop culture. Now, at least some 
members of the Japanese population are fascinated with Korean popular 
culture. Thus, some scholars regard Hallyu as “a counter-case to media 
imperialism: a fissure in West-centered globalization” (Kim 2009, pp. 732-37) 
or as a case proving that globalization is not a one-way traffic but a two-way 
flow (Cho-Han 2003, p. 40). 
The surge of popularity of Korean popular culture in these countries has 
drawn “anti-Hallyu” sentiments and campaigns by a few local intellectuals, 
popular culture industries, and mass media (Chae et al. 2009), especially in 
China (Kang 2008; Yong-chan Kim 2008; Leung 2008; Yun 2009), Taiwan 
(Lin 2006), and Japan (Hanaki et al. 2007), with China and Japan historically 
having had either superior power or colonial power over Korea. These anti-
Hallyu movements, combined with the fact that only a particular drama (for 
example, Winter Sonata in Japan) or a particular genre (e.g., trendy dramas 
with a love story) has been popular in these countries, have led some scholars 
1 Korea in this paper denotes South Korea only.
2 In this paper, I use the term Hallyu to mean both the flow and popularity of Korean popular 
cultural products, especially media contents, in other Asian countries and beyond, as well as 
exported Korean popular cultural products themselves.
3 Korean news media recently reported that a Korean idol group concert in Paris was sold out 
within 15 minutes and a demonstration asking for another concert was staged in front of the Louvre 
museum by ardent fans that could not get tickets (KBS News, May 2, 2011). 
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to conclude that “Hallyu” is a short-term phenomenon that would last only a 
few years (Kyeong-mi Shin 2006; Yoon-Whan Shin 2006).
Despite the suspicion that the Korean Wave is only a temporal and 
isolated trend like a short-lived fashion, it has not only survived but 
expanded to more diverse and wider products and to countries beyond East 
Asia. Thus, a major Korean newspaper recently featured an article entitled 
“Evolving ‘Hallyu’… Japan Is Now Attracted by Korean Culture.” This article 
quotes a Japanese manager of an advertisement and events company saying, 
“The ‘Hallyu’ boom, which was initially limited to such TV dramas as Winter 
Sonata and its main actor Yong-joon Bae, has now expanded to such areas as 
Korean language, food and culture, and has evolved from passive reception to 
active participation in everything Korean” (Chosun ilbo Oct. 4, 2010. p. A20).
Since a Chinese newspaper coined the term Hallyu in 1997, media 
reports and scholarly research on the phenomenon have mounted. Topics 
and issues about Hallyu can be grouped into four broad areas. First, a 
majority of them attempt to explain the rise of Hallyu by asking questions 
like: What factors and backgrounds are responsible for this phenomenon? 
Why have Korean popular cultural products, and not others, become popular 
in those Asian countries? (Hanaki et al. 2007; Jeon 2006; Kim 2003; Kim 
2007; Lee 2006; Leung 2008; Lin 2006; Shim 2008; Yoon-Whan Shin 2006). 
Second, in relation to above questions, some researchers concentrate on the 
issue of Hallyu’s reception. Why are Asian audiences fascinated with Korean 
popular culture? How do they interpret and evaluate imported Korean 
cultural contents? (Hong-xi Han 2005; Kim 2009; Sin 2005; Yun 2009). Third, 
there are also studies that try to assess the effects of Hallyu for both Korea 
and the receiving countries. Many of them are concerned with economic 
effects such as booming tourism, increasing sales of Hallyu-related products, 
and its marketing potential. Others focus on changing images of Korean 
people and culture in those countries where Hallyu has made a hit. A few 
studies report that Korean cultural products or cultural contents have become 
a part of everyday life and culture in these countries as a result of Hallyu 
(Chae 2006; Choe 2007; Eun-kyoung Han 2005; Hong, Gang, and Ohya2007; 
Hwang 2008; Iwabuchi 2008; Kim et al. 2007). Finally, Hallyu has prompted 
theoretical debates on the interpretation of globalization (Cho-Han 2003; 
Chua 2004; Iwabuchi 2008; Kim 2009; Kwon 2006; Shim 2006; Yang 2007). 
Some observers regard Hallyu simply as part of globalization propelled by the 
logic of capital (Cho-Han 2003). Others see it as a case to counter media 
imperialism (Kim 2009). Still others argue for regionalization as part of, or 
against, globalization occurring in Asia. This latter view considers Hallyu as 
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the symptom of a new regional cultural formation (Chua and Iwabuchi 
2008).
After more than a decade since its inception, the question of longevity, 
or the future, of Hallyu still remains a major concern of scholars, journalists, 
and policy makers because people’s tastes change rapidly in this postmodern 
era and a country’s popular culture is framed by many factors including 
economic situations, policy measures, cultural traditions, and historical 
contingencies. Despite skepticism and criticism, however, Hallyu is alive and 
expanding today. A major purpose of this study is to provide some empirical 
evidence for the presence of Hallyu in East Asia. Of course, the key for Hallyu 
is the audience of Korean cultural products. Thus, I will first examine the size 
and characteristics of the Hallyu audience in the three East Asian countries of 
China, Japan, and Taiwan by analyzing survey data. The audience, of course, 
does not reside and behave in a vacuum, but is influenced by structural and 
institutional conditions such as conditions in culture industry, cultural 
market, and mass media, which will also be examined as a background 
utilizing statistical data and previous studies. Another purpose of this study is 
to take stock of existing studies and to move one step further by generalizing 
and comparing the Hallyu phenomenon among the Hallyu-receiving 
countries. Past studies on this subject have mostly been case studies dealing 
with one specific popular cultural product, or Hallyu, in a particular country. 
Some studies have indeed compared several countries, but they focus only on 
a single cultural product and on selected audiences. These studies are limited 
in that they do not generalize the Hallyu phenomenon nor account for 
similarities and differences among countries. By analyzing the data collected 
from the national samples in 2008 for these three East Asian countries, 
supplemented by an examination of structural and institutional backgrounds 
for Hallyu in these countries, this study attempts to fill the gap left by 
previous studies in this regard.
Specifically, this study tries to answer the following questions. First, is 
Hallyu alive today in China, Japan, and Taiwan? If so, to what extent? Second, 
what are the characteristics of the Hallyu audience in these countries? In what 
terms is the Hallyu audience distinct from non-Hallyu audience? Third, do 
the three countries differ in terms of the characteristics of the Hallyu 
audience and of the structural and institutional conditions that can affect 
Hallyu? How?
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Theoretical Approaches to and Empirical Works on Hallyu
One of the prominent theories that inform existing studies on Hallyu is 
the theory of globalization. It seems to be quite appropriate that Hallyu is 
approached from the perspective of globalization, because it involves cross-
border flow of cultural products and recent globalization process in East Asia 
has laid the base for it through liberalization of markets and deregulation of 
the culture industry sector. In fact, Hallyu has provoked heated debates on 
the nature of globalization, especially in East Asia. 
There are diverse models and dimensions of globalization. A prominent 
model is the political-economic one, which explains globalization in terms of 
changing conditions of capitalism. According to James Mittelman (2000), for 
example, the recent phase of globalization started as a response to the deep 
recession in Western countries in the 1970s. In order to get over the economic 
crisis, new strategies including restructuring, deregulation, privatization, and 
enhanced competitiveness, which have been elevated to the neo-liberal 
ideology, were adopted. In addition to the transnational ideology of neo-
liberalism, Ramesh Mishra argues, hegemony of the Anglo-Saxon form of 
capitalism has also been extended and consolidated in this process (Mishra 
1999, pp. 7-8). In this model, economic factors, or more precisely the logic of 
capital, are foremost in importance for the modern phase of globalization, 
and they subsume all other aspects of globalization. 
But, globalization is a complex term involving many dimensions, 
including not only economic and political but also social and cultural ones. 
This study is specifically concerned with cultural globalization, the 
contemporary process of which has been driven by establishment of new 
global cultural infrastructure, the rise of Western popular culture, the 
dominance of multinational culture industries, and an increase in cultural 
exchange and interaction across national borders (Held et al. 1999, p. 341). 
Cultural globalization is often associated with the notion of imperialism, 
which is regarded as its earlier form (Tomlinson 1991; Schiller 1979; Crane 
2002; Curren and Park 2000). According to this conception, cultural 
imperialism refers simply to cultural domination, or to the imposition of a 
particular nation’s beliefs, values, knowledge, behavioral norms, and style of 
life by core nations over peripheral ones. It emerged in the 1960s as part of a 
Marxist critique of advanced capitalist cultures that emphasize consumerism, 
hedonism, and mass communication.
Cultural imperialism has been criticized on many grounds. For one, 
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cultural flow is not necessarily one-way, from the core to the periphery, but 
multi-directional, sometimes flowing from the periphery to the core (Berger 
2002; Crane 2002). Critiques also indicate that the theory fails to acknowledge 
the significance of local resistance to imperial culture, especially the rise of 
nationalism in opposition to globalization, and that it ignores the processes of 
negotiation, adaptation, and indigenization on the part of receiving cultures 
(Curren and Park 2000; Robertson 1994). Thus, it is often the case that, 
instead of a global, uniform culture as a result of cultural imperialism, local 
indigenous cultures are rediscovered, and hybrid cultures are created 
(Appadurai 1990; Nederveen Pieterse 1995).  
Existing works on Hallyu based on the models of globalization may be 
grouped into the following three categories: the political-economic, the 
cultural, and the social. The first approach emphasizes political and economic 
backgrounds for the sudden boom of Korean popular culture in Asia. It takes 
neo-liberalism prevalent after the fall of the communist bloc in the late 1980s 
as a major contributor to the cultural flow from Korea to other East Asian 
countries. Many countries in Asia have opened up their markets, especially 
cultural markets, to foreign imports in the 1990s due to pressures from the 
super powers and international financial organizations such as the IMF and 
WTO. As a result, not only did cultural products begin to flow more freely 
among Asian countries, but increasing international competition has also led 
to heavier investments in the culture industry and to more choices for 
cultural consumers in this region. In this view, Hallyu is simply the case of 
Korean culture industry taking advantage of this changing market situation 
(Shim 2006; Kim 2009).
Some critical observers view Hallyu as a product of recent capitalist 
development. For example, according to Hyejung Cho-Han (2003), Korean 
cultural products are the Korean version of American commercial culture, 
and Hallyu is simply an extension of the Korean export industry that includes 
the culture industry. Major Hallyu products are cultural products of “turbo” 
capitalism that forsake tradition in a definite way (Cho-Han 2003, p. 35). In 
this sense, Korean popular cultural products are simply commodities like any 
other manufactured goods that are exported to other Asian countries. 
However, Cho-Han warns against viewing Hallyu as a case of cultural 
imperialism, e.g., the diffusion of superior culture to the inferior one. Rather, 
it should be regarded as part of the complex and dynamic process of cultural 
globalization which flows in both directions rather than in one direction.
In a similar vein, Hyun-Mee Kim (2003) explains the Hallyu phenomenon 
in the context of industrial restructuring after the 1997 economic crisis. The 
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economic crisis and attendant IMF bailout, according to Kim, have made 
Korea thoroughly reexamine the process of late modernization which was 
heavily dependent on manufacturing industries and turn to high value-added 
culture industry for a breakthrough (Kim 2003, p. 156). As a result, Korean 
cultural products are put on the Asian market and traded like other products 
along with other countries’ cultural products. In her case study on Hallyu in 
Taiwan, Kim notes that “the popular culture industry in Taiwan is still 
dominated by the U.S., Japan, and China, and Korean popular culture is 
regarded simply as one of the other multiple foreign products” (Kim 2003, p. 
178). Thus, she cautions that exportation of cultural products to other 
countries is certainly a novel phenomenon for Korea but should not be 
exaggerated because it is part of recent globalization occurring in Asia in 
general, thanks to the combination of new digital communications technologies 
and pre-modern system of circulation.
These political-economic approaches, whether critical or not, tend to 
emphasize structural or institutional backgrounds for the rise of Hallyu, and 
have certainly made a valuable contribution toward understanding its 
institutional or material base. But these approaches are not sufficient in 
explaining why Korean cultural products, and no other countries,’ have been 
successful in this particular juncture, especially when popular culture of 
Japan, which is economically and politically more powerful than Korea, had 
been dominant in this region for a long time. Also, these approaches tend to 
ignore the complex process of reception, which should be regarded as key in 
explaining the popularity of Korean cultural products in the receiving 
countries. At best, they assume passive audiences who consume, without 
much pondering, whatever products provided to them by culture industries 
or media. The audiences’ desires or needs are supposed to be manufactured 
by culture industries which specialize in producing images, fantasies, and 
dreams, according to a critical view on contemporary capitalist popular 
culture (Kim 2003). 
Thus, some researchers look to cultural aspects of Hallyu to find a clue 
to its success. Many of them pay greater attention to its contents, for example, 
Confucian elements or traditional values in Korean dramas, which attract 
certain segments of the population of the receiving countries (Hong-xi Han 
2005; Lee et al. 2006; Yang 2006). Parallel to this emphasis on cultural 
contents, cultural tastes and the reception process of the audiences have been 
examined and found to contain certain common elements with Korean 
popular culture. Studies following this cultural reception approach agree 
mostly with the cultural proximity thesis. Simply put, it posits that culture 
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flows more easily between culturally similar countries than between 
culturally different ones (Chua 2004; Son and Yang 2003; Yang 2006). In 
other words, according to this theory, people tend to accept more readily 
those imported cultural products that have something common with their 
own values, feelings, and experiences. And some of the Korean popular 
cultural products, especially TV dramas and movies, are pregnant with 
Confucian ethics and traditional values such as harmony, community, strong 
morality, and respect for family ties, which seem to attract cultural 
consumers in East Asia (Yoon-Whan Shin 2006; Yun 2009). Hallyu in Japan 
is a typical case for this explanation. Japanese middle-aged women, who were 
fascinated with the Korean drama Winter Sonata, found in the drama their 
old-fashioned values such as respect for family and kinship networks, 
restrained expression of love, and pure love (Hanaki et al. 2007; Jeon 2006; 
Kyeong-mi Shin 2006). Others indicate that racial proximity, e.g., “shared 
norms of beauty, mannerism, styles in clothing, and sense of Asianness,” is 
the key to the flow of cultural contents in Asia, not cultural proximity (Kim 
2007, p. 48).
But this cultural commonality approach is obviously not enough to 
explain the Hallyu phenomenon in Asian. For one, such South Asian 
countries as Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia, not to mention 
Mongolia and Uzbekistan, are not Confucian and share little cultural 
elements with Korea (Yoon-Whan Shin 2006; Kim 2007; Yang 2006). It also 
tends to ignore the complexity of the reception process and the changing 
nature of national culture (Kim 2009).
In a similar vein, the concept of cultural discount emphasizes that 
distinctiveness of a country’s cultural products in terms of values, believes, 
and style may hinder their acceptance by consumers in other countries. 
Iwabuchi’s account of Japanese cultural products exported to other Asian 
countries is a typical example. He contends that Japanese cultural producers 
are careful to remove “Japanese odor” from their products so as not to induce 
resistance from foreign audiences (Iwabuchi 2004). In a sense, Korean 
cultural products, which have indigenized Western popular culture that 
resulted in a hybrid culture blending traditional Asian and modern Western 
cultures, provide less cultural discount to Asian audiences who want to enjoy 
modern Western popular culture but, at the same time, are reluctant to accept 
the latter outright due to ideological and other reasons (Gim 2007; Hong-xi 
Han. 2005; Lee et al. 2006; Lee 2006; Shim 2006; Yun 2009). 
The thesis of cultural hybridity requests our attention be turned to the 
tastes of young Asian audiences who prefer modern to traditional, and 
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Western to Confucian, cultural products, because most of them grew up in a 
more prosperous period in history and are in better contact with Western 
culture due to recent developments in communication and transportation 
technologies. Some observers note that Korean popular cultural products are 
unique in that they are mainly Western in form but mostly traditional 
Confucian in contents (Yun 2009; Shim 2006; Lee 2006). These unique 
characteristics of Korean popular culture have attracted many young Asian 
audiences who are fond of cultural products of modern flavor but are uneasy 
with Western cultural contents. Unlike Japan where Hallyu is consumed 
mainly by older women, young Chinese are the majority consumers of 
Korean popular culture which seems to work to fill the gap between their 
desire for modern cultural products and the relative inability of the country’s 
culture industry to meet their needs. A study of the Chinese culture industry 
reports that the main target of TV programs in China is middle-aged 
audiences who prefer traditional cultural contents over modern Western ones 
and that the socialist Chinese government has kept a repressive policy on the 
import of foreign, especially Western, cultural products because it is afraid 
the latter may contaminate Chinese people and culture with Western 
capitalist culture (Lee 2006; Yun 2009).
The reception theory or the cultural approach to Hallyu provide some 
important and interesting explanations as to why Asian people like imported 
Korean popular culture. But the explanatory power of these approaches is 
obviously limited, because there seem to be contradictory cases and Asian 
consumers of popular culture have apparently differing cultural tastes and 
preferences even within a single society. Thus, some researchers argue that 
people’s tastes and behaviors tend to be differentiated greatly based on diverse 
social factors such as socio-economic status, demographic characteristics, 
and so on in this age of information and postmodernism. In other words, 
modern consumers, especially young ones, seem to emphasize their own 
individuality and distinction from others in their lifestyle and cultural 
consumption. Therefore, cultural contents themselves do not attract and 
classify consumers, but their social and demographic differences determine 
their consumption behavior. Their social backgrounds and life experiences, 
especially differences in the socialization process, seem to be more important 
than others in differentiating taste groups. Herbert Gans (1999) is an earlier 
proponent of this thesis. He identifies five social classes in America that have 
their own distinct cultural tastes and lifestyle. Crane (1992), on the other 
hand, talks about culture class rather than class culture. She argues that 
cultural tastes are no longer dependent on class differences but differentiated 
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based more on age group and gender. Many of the empirical works on Hallyu 
also find that social and demographic characteristics of its consumers are 
closely related to their consumption patterns (Heo 2002; Lee 2006; Lin and 
Tong 2008; Mori 2008).
From the above review of theories and empirical works on Hallyu, we 
may discern five distinct approaches, or groups of factors, that broadly help 
explain the flow of Korean popular cultural products to other Asian 
countries: structural and institutional backgrounds, globalism-nationalism 
dichotomy, the proximity theses, modernity approach, and socio-
demographic factors. These approaches have contributed to the 
understanding of Hallyu, but each one of them has only a limited explanatory 
power if considered separately from others because they have been proved to 
work in differing degrees among the receiving countries of Hallyu. It is thus 
necessary to consider them together in order to have a fuller picture of the 
Hallyu phenomenon. But it is impossible to consider all of them fully in a 
single paper. Therefore, I will selectively consider the approaches and factors 
in this study by focusing on institutional backgrounds and the tastes and 
characteristics of audiences, with commonalities and differences among 
different receiving countries in mind. 
Data and Method of Analysis
Data
Two kinds of data are utilized in this study. One is statistical data with 
regard to cultural markets and culture industry in Korea, most of which are 
produced by government agencies and research institutes. Data to be 
analyzed include the size as well as changes over time and variations among 
countries and genres of Korean cultural products exported to East Asian 
countries for the past several years. Changes in cultural policies and market 
situations both in Korea and other East Asian countries are also examined. 
Resulting data will provide evidence for the continuity and transformation of 
Hallyu at the aggregate level. They will also provide some information on the 
structural and institutional background of Hallyu.
The second, but very important, source of data in this study is the 2008 
EASS (East Asian Social Survey). EASS is a national sample survey conducted 
annually in four East Asian countries of China, Japan, Korea, and Taiwan to 
collect data on various aspects of peoples’ lives, opinions, and attitudes, and 
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the 2008 EASS was conducted in 2008 in each of the four member countries. 
A brief description of the four national samples is given in table 1. Each 
member country has its own questionnaire, but includes a special module 
that applies to all four members. The special module for 2008 EASS is 
“Culture and Globalization in East Asia,” which contains questions regarding 
consumption of foreign cultural products, cultural values and tastes, social 
distance and social networks, attitudes toward globalization, and so on. This 
study analyzes responses to the questions in this special module in China, 
Japan and Taiwan.
Measurement of Variables
The dependent variable is the consumption of Korean TV dramas by 
respondents in China, Japan, and Taiwan. It was, after all, Korean TV dramas 
that initiated and sustained Hallyu in East Asia, although Hallyu has 
subsequently expanded to other cultural products such as popular music, 
movies, digital games, fashion, food, etc.  This variable is measured by asking, 
“How often do you watch Korean TV drama?” Respondents were instructed 
to pick one of four possible answers to this question: (1) often, (2) sometimes, 
(3) seldom, (4) not at all.
There are three types of independent variables, reflecting the three major 
approaches to Hallyu, that is, the globalization approach, the proximity thesis, 
and the modernity theory. The globalization approach assumes that Hallyu is 
simply part of the globalization process, to which each country responds 
either favorably or unfavorably, i.e., accepts foreign cultural products or 
resists them from a nationalistic standpoint. Globalism-nationalism that 
measures this variable consists of three items, to which respondents were 
asked to answer on a seven-point scale from ① “strongly agree” to ⑦ 
“strongly disagree.” The three questions are as follows. (1) The country 
(respondent’s own country) should limit importation of foreign products in 
order to protect its national economy; (2) The country should follow its 
national interests even if these would lead to conflicts with other nations’ and 
(3) Increased exposure to foreign films, music, and books is damaging our 
own culture. The measure of globalism-nationalism variable is simply the 
sum of the scores for the three items.
The second independent variable, social proximity, is also a composite 
variable consisting of three items measuring social distance to Korean people. 
This is a proxy variable for the cultural proximity thesis. Because the cultural 
proximity theory is limited in its application and other types of proximity 
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such as racial proximity are proposed in explaining the popularity of Korean 
popular culture in Asia (Kim 2007), a more general measure of proximity 
seems to be necessary; social proximity can be an alternative. For this 
measure, respondents were asked to answer ① “yes” or ② ”no” to the following 
three questions: (1) Can you accept Korean people working alongside you at 
your workplace? (2) Can you accept Korean people living on your street as 
neighbors? (3) Can you accept Korean people as close kin by marriage? The 
social proximity variable is the sum of the scores for these items. 
The third independent variable is the modernity-tradition variable that 
which represents the modernity theory. This variable is measured by six 
items, which were answered on a seven-point scale from ① “strongly agree” 
to ⑦ “strongly disagree.”. The six items are as follows: (1) It is not desirable to 
oppose an idea which the majority of people accept, even if it is different 
from one’s own. (2) One should not express one’s complaints about others in 
order to have a good relationship with them. (3) When hiring someone at a 
private company, it would be better to give the opportunity to relatives or 
Table 1
Demographic and Socio-economic Characteristics of the Samples (%)
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Total 3007 2144 2066
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friends even if an unacquainted person is more qualified. (4) I feel honored 
when people who come from the same town play an important role in 
society. (5) A subordinate should obey superiors’ instructions even if s/he 
does not agree with them. (6) It is better to let capable leaders decide 
everything. This variable is also a composite variable summing the scores for 
the six items.
Finally, control variables include gender, age, education (highest level of 
education attended), working status (working versus non-working), and 
subjective social status (subjective position on a ten-point scale) representing 
respondents’ demographics, and socio-economic characteristics (cf. table 1 
for a description of these variables). 
Method of Analysis
For structural and institutional backgrounds on Hallyu, frequency tables 
and some cross-tabulations are mostly given, the goal of which is to provide 
some basic statistical information for the flow of Korean cultural products to 
the three East Asian countries on an aggregate level.
Survey data are analyzed using such statistical methods as cross 
tabulation and regression analysis. For multivariate analysis, the dependent 
variable is converted into a dummy variable by combining “often” and 
“sometimes” as 1, and “seldom” and “not at all” as 0. The three independent 
variables are all composite variables consisting of more than one item. In 
order to simplify the procedure, actual scores of the items for each variable 
are added to produce the score for the composite variable.4 For the 
multivariate relationship between the dummy dependent variable and the 
composite independent variables, logistic regression analyses are utilized. 
Structural and Institutional Bases of Hallyu 
It was, above all, the development of the Korean popular cultural market 
and industry, together with globalization and expansion of the Asian market 
that made Hallyu possible. This will be reviewed briefly below.
Korean cultural market had been closed to foreign input for quite a 
while, and its culture industry had been very much underdeveloped due to 
the government’s strict control of cultural flow and cultural market since the 
4 See appendix for factor analyses results for these variables.
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liberation from Japanese colonial rule in 1945. The Kim Young Sam 
government (1992-1997), the first civilian government since the military 
dictatorship of two-and-a-half decades, took neoliberalism as its basic 
ideology and liberalized Korean economy by joining the WTO in 1995 and 
the OECD in 1996. This neoliberal economic policy is at least partly 
responsible for the 1997 economic crisis, which brought about the IMF 
intervention and liberalization policies. Subsequent Kim Dae Jung 
government (1998-2003) had no choice but to follow the IMF-mandated 
structural reform which emphasized liberalization, deregulation, and 
privatization (Yang 2007, p. 184).
As part of liberalization, Korean cultural market began to open to 
foreign influence. Allowing Hollywood film distributors to do business in 
Korea in 1988 was probably the first foreign intrusion into the Korean 
cultural market, although foreign films were screened by local distributors 
within the limit of certain quotas set by the government even before this 
event. Since the mid-1990s when cable television services started, the number 
of television channels has greatly expanded, followed by rapid increase in 
importation of foreign programs. Ban on importation of Japanese popular 
culture, which had been imposed for more than five decades, has been lifted 
step by step since 1998. These are a few of the events that have made the 
Korean cultural market wide-open, resulting in its globalization and 
enhanced competitiveness (Shim 2008; Yang 2007). 
Korean government also realized and emphasized the economic value of 
the culture and media industry. The government has, since the early 1990s, 
supported the culture industry by establishing the Culture Industry Bureau 
for the first time in the Ministry of Culture and Tourism in 1994 and by 
enacting the Motion Pictures Promotion Law in 1995, which encouraged big 
corporations (jaebeol) to invest in the film industry. In response to this 
government effort and to the opportunities to make a profit in this sector, 
jaebeols actively participated in the industry but had to withdraw shortly after 
the 1997 economic crisis under the IMF-mandated restructuring scheme. 
However, their short-lived participation has left an important and positive 
legacy in the industry in the form of highly educated young professionals 
with top-notch management skills (Shim 2006; Yang 2007). 
In addition to these government actions and market changes, the 
dramatic expansion of communications and information industries, their 
extensive penetration into everyday life, and people’s greater concern with 
quality of life as a result of improvement in life conditions have contributed 
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greatly to the development of culture industry.5 
Recent changes in other Asian cultural markets are no less important for 
the rise of Hallyu. Below, I will examine changes in the three East Asian 
countries’ cultural markets, culture industries, and policies.
Japan has a unique place in East Asia because it is the first modernized 
country in Asia and the only country that colonized many parts of the region 
in modern times. Because of these facts, at least in part, it has always looked 
to the West and considered itself as “being in Asia but not part of Asia” (Chua 
2008, p. 80) or “always in and yet always above Asia” (Iwabuchi 2004, p. 150). 
This attitude of “Japan is forward and the rest backward” is probably 
responsible for its reluctance to actively engage in a cultural relationship with 
other Asian countries. Japanese popular culture, however, has been popular 
since 1970 in a few East Asian countries such as Taiwan, Hong Kong, and 
Singapore. At first, audiences of Japanese popular culture in these countries 
were limited to a minority of enthusiasts but became widespread in the 1990s, 
especially among young people. At that time, Japanese culture industry, 
which had been mostly inward-looking because its domestic market was 
large enough to support it, began to search for overseas cultural markets. 
Paradoxically, the popularity of Japanese popular culture began to wane by 
then (Iwabuchi 2002). 
Japan’s cultural relationship with Korea had been strained for a long time 
because of the aforementioned ban on importing Japanese popular culture 
due to Korea’s experience of colonial rule by Japan for 35 years. However, 
even before the opening-up of Korean cultural market to Japanese cultural 
products, they were smuggled in by enthusiastic fans and copied by Korean 
cultural producers, most notably television programs. Concurrently, a few 
Korean popular singers gained fame in Japan even before 1998, and some of 
the Korean films, such as Shiri, were well-received by the Japanese audience 
in early 2000s (Kyeong-mi Shin 2006). A series of events including the 1988 
Seoul Olympic Games and the 2002 FIFA Korea-Japan World Cup also 
helped change Korea’s image in Japan and the otherwise sore relationship 
between the two countries to a friendly one (Mori 2008). 
Above all, it was the television drama series Winter Sonata that raised 
Hallyu to its zenith in Japan. It was aired in 2003 by NHK satellite, and 
rebroadcasted in 2004 by NHK free-to-air station in response to overwhelming 
audience ratings. It has had far-reaching effects on Japanese reception of 
Korean popular culture since then; in 2004 alone, 29 Korean movies were 
5 See Shim (2008) and Yang (2009) for a detailed account of these changes.
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screened in Japan and 63 terrestrial television stations out of a total of 127 
broadcast 70 Korean dramas in early 2005 (Kyeong-mi Shin 2006, p. 234). 
Japanese and Korean experts often mention the following reasons for the 
enormous popularity of Winter Sonata, such as Japanese audience’s sense of 
nostalgia and high quality of the drama, traditional values such as family-
centeredness, pure love, restrained human relationship, simple and slow-
moving story, stagnation of Japanese society following a long-term economic 
recession, and changes in Korea’s image among the Japanese (Kyeong-mi Shin 
2006, p. 236-42; Yoon and Na 2005a, 2005b). Each of these reasons may have 
contributed to the rise of Hallyu in Japan to a certain extent. But the major 
factor for Korean dramas’ appeal in Japan seems to be the nostalgia of the 
middle-aged Japanese audience who found the social and cultural atmosphere 
of 20 to 30 years ago in Korean dramas (Chae and Yoon 2006). In fact, 
according to Iwabuchi, the Japanese audience in general tends to view popular 
culture of other Asian countries with a sense of nostalgia arising from the 
attitude that Japan is at a higher level of development than the rest of Asia 
which is regarded as being culturally and historically backward vis-à-vis 
Japan (Iwabuchi 2008, pp. 245-49).
The People’s Republic of China had been a secluded communist country 
since 1949, but it made a drastic transformation of its communist economy 
into a market economy under Deng Xiao Ping’s “four modernization policy” 
in the 1980s. The drive towards more liberalized economic reforms has not 
only geared to a great expansion of mass media but also has been translated 
into a gradual commercial view on media policy. Competition among mass 
media in attracting audiences has become keen, which has led them to adopt 
such measures as making more of entertaining and profit-making products, 
importing them from abroad, and co-producing with non-Chinese finance 
(Stockman 2000, pp. 169-70). 
In the early 1990, the film and television industries were liberalized, and 
cable and satellite television networks grew rapidly, due in part to the 
development of media technologies and also in part to popular demand for 
leisure from economically improved audiences. Satellite television networks 
have made broadcasts from Taiwan and Hong Kong available to Chinese 
viewers, which resulted in the state losing its monopoly over broadcasting. 
Subsequently, the state changed its policy on television production from 
“literature and arts” to “entertainment,” and the media industry took profit 
maximization as its prime motive (Leung 2008, p. 58). 
The burgeoning of local television stations and the scarcity of local 
programs due to low production capacity have made Chinese television 
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stations turn to foreign programs which are cheaper than local productions 
and which often provide ideas and formats to be adopted by local producers 
(Leung 2008). In fact, there have been a flow of media contents among ethnic 
Chinese countries, i.e., Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and China. As well, a 
study reports that Japanese television programs were popular among Chinese 
television viewers in the 1970s and 1980s, but Japanese programs have 
become less popular and consumed by only a fragmented young audience in 
the 1990s (Iwabuchi 2002, pp. 123-37).
However, liberalization of media in China does not mean total freedom 
of speech such as enjoyed by the media in the West. Television production is 
still heavily regulated and censored by such government agencies as the State 
Administration of Radio, Film and Television.6 Chinese government is 
especially sensitive towards “foreign elements,” which is regulated by such 
policy measures as the quota system that limits foreign programs to less than 
20 percent of the total broadcasting time and restriction on broadcasting 
foreign programs during prime time (Leung 2008). 
Thus, Hallyu in China should be examined in the context of “balancing 
between market-driven modernization on the one hand, and social 
conservatism and political (and ideological) dictatorship on the other” 
(Leung 2008, p. 58). The case of Korean television drama “Dae Jang Geum” 
(Jewel in the Palace), which was a phenomenal hit in China, is a good 
example of this complex situation. “Dae Jang Geum” was imported first by a 
provincial satellite television station, Hunan TV, from a Taiwanese television 
station who had copyright ownership of the drama. One of the major reasons 
Hunan TV imported “Dae Jang Geum” is that the drama had already proven 
to be extremely popular in Taiwan and Hong Kong. Because local stations are 
not allowed to approach foreign distributors directly, however, Hunan TV 
had to buy the right to broadcast from a Taiwanese TV station instead of the 
original Korean producer. In order to promote this Korean drama, Hunan 
TV employed various publicity programs paralleling the content of the 
drama, published booklets depicting its story, cast, historical background, 
and so on, and indigenized it through dubbing and subtitling (Leung 2008; 
Chua and Iwabuchi 2008). Other reasons for the success of “Dae Jang Geum” 
include its “depoliticized, culturally correct nature” in the sense that the 
6 This agency recently sent out directives to all major television stations not to broadcast 
entertainment programs for three months but to broadcast only those dramas and documentaries 
which depict or propagate Chinese Communist revolution and socialist ideology in order to 
commemorate the 90th anniversary of the foundation of the Chinese Communist Party (Chosun ilbo, 
May 6, 2011).
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drama focuses on family values and commercial competition which are 
culturally proximate and politically neutral (Leung 2008, p. 64), unlike 
Western and Japanese popular culture which is ideologically threatening and 
emotionally unacceptable (Yun 2009).   
In Taiwan, cable channels make up a major part of the television 
industry from the start, supplementing the three free-to-air stations whose 
signals could not be received by some of the country’s population. Since the 
late 1970s, illegal cable television stations have burgeoned rapidly to meet the 
audiences’ demand for entertainment programs which the three terrestrial 
television stations cannot provide due to the authoritarian government’s strict 
control over them. Since Taiwan became an independent state that seceded 
from mainland China in 1949, the KMT (The Nationalist Party) government 
had run the country under martial law, and every aspect of society was tightly 
controlled by it.
The government tried to stop the illegal cable channels, but in vain. Or it 
may be better a description to say that the Taiwanese government took a 
hands-off policy on television, imposing loose restrictions on ownership, 
number of channels, number of foreign programs, and so on. Since the 1980s, 
democratic and liberal movements have sprung up as a result of strong 
economic growth and market liberalization, and the government finally lifted 
martial law in 1987. Under pressure from the US, a new copyright law was 
passed in 1992 and a new cable television law in 1993, which legalized the 
cable television stations and allowed them to broadcast foreign programs up 
to 80 percent of the air time. It was estimated that more than 80 percent of 
the Taiwanese audience watched cable television channels, which numbered 
more than 120 as of the early 2000s (Lin 2006; Kim 2003). 
As a result of these changes in the media industry, Taiwanese cable 
television stations began to import a large number of foreign programs in the 
1990s. The increased number of channels demanded equally large number of 
programs, while the share of each channel in the market decreased. For 
example, a study reported that the share of the top ten programs in the 
viewership ratings amounted to only 4 percent. Thus, in order to make a 
profit, channel providers had to resort to importation of foreign programs 
that are relatively cheaper than domestic production, but of high quality. 
During the period of illegal cable system, imported television programs were 
mostly from Hong Kong, China, and Japan, from which 62, 54, and 61 
dramas were imported, respectively, for the period of 1993-1999 (Lin 2006). 
Broadcasting of Japanese dramas increased rapidly after the Taiwanese 
government lifted the ban on importation of Japanese cultural products in 
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1993, which was imposed due to its colonial history. The audiences of 
Japanese television dramas were mostly young people who seemed to have 
cultural tastes of a modern flavor. According to an expert on Asian popular 
culture, “Taiwanese consumption of Japanese TV dramas … is due in part to 
an emerging sense…of coevalness with the Japanese, that is, the feeling that 
Taiwanese share a modern temporality with Japan” (Iwabuchi 2002, p. 122).
Even after the deregulation of the media industry, however, Taiwanese 
cable television providers showed little interest in Korean dramas due to a 
couple of factors in addition to language and cultural barriers. One factor is 
political: The long-standing friendly relationship between the two countries 
was abruptly ended in 1992 when Korea established formal diplomatic 
relationship with People’s Republic of China (PRC). The other is cultural: 
Taiwanese consumers perceived Korean cultural products as backward (Lin 
2006; Kim 2003). This situation changed since the late 1990s, when GTV, a 
cable channel which specialize in domestic programs mainly for older rural 
housewives, began to import Korean dramas because the latter were much 
cheaper than domestic ones and of high quality. The imported Korean 
dramas were “domesticated” before broadcasting, with Chinese dubbing and 
subtitling, inserting Taiwanese pop songs at the beginning, replacing OSTs 
with Taiwanese songs, and adapted translation (i.e., the original version of the 
drama was reconstituted in accordance with Taiwanese cultural system) 
(Hwang 2007; Kim 2003). GTV did not even label these imported Korean 
dramas as Korean dramas. 
It was in 2000 that Hallyu took off in Taiwan, when a Korean drama 
entitled Fireworks became an immense success. Other channel providers 
soon followed suit and Korean dramas began to replace Japanese ones in 
Taiwanese television, at least in part. It should be noted, however, that 
Taiwanese television stations imported only certain types of Korean 
programs, mostly romantic love stories, avoiding complicated historical or 
social ones, which mainly targeted female audiences. This can be a limiting 
factor, according to an observer, for continuing success of Hallyu in Taiwan 
(Lin 2006).
The Growth of Hallyu
Due to these changes in the neighboring countries as well as in its own 
structural and institutional conditions, Korean culture industry grew rapidly. 
Total sales of the Korean culture industry had grown 21 percent per annum 
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for the period of 1999-2003, compared with the GDP growth rate of 6.1 
percent for the same period. The industry’s growth rate has slowed down 
since 2003, with an average of 4.2 percent per year for the period of 2004-
2008, due primarily to the recent world-wide economic recession (MCT 
2003, p. 28; MCST 2010a, p. 19). The publishing industry was the largest in 
terms of its share in the total sales (35.7 percent) in 2008, followed by 
broadcasting (18.6 percent), advertisement (15.8 percent), and game (9.5 
percent).
As globalization swept throughout the world, many of the Asian national 
markets began, from the early 1990s, to open their doors to foreign cultural 
flows. The Korean culture industry has gradually participated in the 
international market, exporting its products in increasingly large numbers 
firstly to such East Asian countries as China, Taiwan, and Japan and 
subsequently to the regions beyond East Asia. For example, the total value of 
exportation of the Korean culture industry was 413 million dollars in 1998, 
but increased more than twice to 939 million dollars in 2004. It took only 
four years for the total amount of export to double to 1,884 million dollars in 
2008 (see table 2). The digital game industry has led the export drive, 
comprising 58 percent of total export in 2008, followed by publishing (13.8 
percent), character (12.1 percent), and broadcasting (8.5 percent). These four 
Table 2
Annual Export of Korean Cultural Products by Sector
  (Unit: million US$, %)
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sectors combined account for more than 90 percent of export and have been 
leading exporters for the past decade, with little variations among them in 
terms of relative weight. The game industry has always been the leading 
exporter with its weight increasing, while the share taken up by the publishing 
industry has been decreasing considerably. The other two sectors seem to 
remain stable, while the total amount of export by these industries has been 
steadily increasing. 
In terms of destination, more than half of the Korean culture industry 
export goes to Asian countries, with the distant second being North America. 
Japan has been the leading importer of Korean cultural products, but China 
and Southeast Asia are rapidly closing the gap with Japan. As seen in table 3, 
Japan’s share of Korean export in 2006 was 27.2 percent, while China and 
Southeast Asia took up 18.5 percent and 8.7 percent, respectively. But these 
shares changed to 20.6 percent, 20.1 percent, and 19.7 percent, respectively, in 
2008. There are also considerable variations among the countries in terms of 
importation of cultural products. More than 80 percent of China’s total 
import from the Korean culture industry was from the game industry in 
2008, followed by 10.6 percent from the character industry, 5.4 percent from 
the publishing industry, and 2.2 percent from the broadcasting industry. The 
figures for Japan were 61.2, 3.4, 6.7, and 17.6, whereas those for Southeast 
Asia were 68.0, 5.9, 19.5, and 4.8, respectively. Thus, character was the second 
major import for China besides game, broadcasting for Japan, and publishing 
for Southeast Asia.
Since Hallyu started with the export of Korean television dramas, and 
since media industry is the most influential in affecting people’s attitudes and 
Table 3
Annual Export of Korean Cultural Products by Destination
  (Unit: million US$, %)
Year China Japan Southeast Asia
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MCST (2010b) p. 81 for the year 2008.
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tastes, I will look more closely at the performance of the broadcasting 
industry. In 1996, Korea exported 6 million dollars’ worth of broadcasting 
programs, while importing 63.9 million dollars of broadcasting programs. 
Within 5 years, however, broadcasting export grew threefold to 18.9 million 
dollars in 2001, which contrasts with the threefold reduction of import. For 
the first ten years of the new millennium, export of media programs 
increased ten times from 18.9 million dollars to 187 million dollars in 2010. 
The growth rate peaked during the five-year period from 2001 to 2005, with 
an average annual growth rate of 57 percent. Since then, growth rate has 
much slowed down a lot, obviously reflecting the recent stagnation in the 
world economy (table 4). 
Among the programs exported, drama stands out, accounting for about 
90 percent of the total broadcasting export in the past five years. Among 
other programs, entertainment, animation, and documentary each account 
for more than 1 percent of the total program export. Export of documentary 
programs in particular jumped from 0.9 million dollars (0.8% of the total 
export) in 2009 to 9.8 million dollars (6.5%) in 2010 (table 5). In terms of 
destination of broadcasting export, Japan is the biggest importer (81.6 million 
dollars, or 53.9%, of the total in 2010), followed by Taiwan (20.0 million 
dollars, 13.2%), and China (18.2 million dollars, 12%). But the share of total 
Table 4
Annual Export and Import of Korean Broadcasting Programs
  (Unit: million US$, %)
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export for Japan has been decreasing while those for China and Taiwan have 
been increasing. These three East Asian countries have imported more than 
80 percent of the total Korean broadcasting export in the past five years (table 
6). Again, drama accounts for more than 90 percent of program import for 
these three countries, followed by entertainment and documentary in 2009 
(table 7).
From the above analysis of aggregate data, we may conclude that the 
international flow of Korean cultural products has expanded continuously for 
the past decade, with some fluctuations due to external factors such as 
economic recession, policy changes, and anti-Hallyu movement. The main 
actor of Hallyu, that is, TV drama, has especially fared well, with its export 
growing more than 30 percent for the period of 2006-2010. Hallyu has 
recently spread widely beyond East Asia, but Japan, China, and Taiwan are 
still its main destinations. However, it should be noted that the three 
countries differ in the favored contents and forms of Korean popular culture 
and in the process of its reception, as shown here and documented in many 
Table 5
Export of Korean Broadcasting Programs by Genre, 2005-2010
  (Unit: 1,000 US$, %)
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period from 2007 to 2009; KOCCA (2011) p. 11 for the year 2010.
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other studies. 
It should also be pointed out that expansion of export of Korean cultural 
products or broadcasting programs is only partial evidence for the 
continuing and increasing presence of Hallyu in these countries. As a cultural 
Table 6
Export of Korean Broadcasting Programs by Destination, 2005-2010
  (Unit: 1,000 US$, %)

































































































 Source.—MCST (2010b). p. 335 for the period from 2005 to 2007; KBI (2009) p. 17 for the 
year 2008; KOCCA (2010) p. 15 for the year 2009.
 * Southeast Asia includes Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, Malaysia, and the Philippines.
Table 7
2009 Export of Broadcasting Programs by Genre for China, Japan, and 
Taiwan
  (Unit: 1,000 US$, %)
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phenomenon involving people’s attitudes and perceptions, Hallyu does not 
necessarily require massive consumption of Korean cultural goods; it has 
usually been induced more often by widespread cultural reception such as 
watching TV or listening to music. Thus, a single TV drama such as Winter 
Sonata in Japan or “Dae Jang Geum” in Taiwan and China was enough to 
spur public interest in Korean cultural products and to start the Korean 
Wave. What really matters in discussions and explanations on Hallyu is how 
many people favor and actually watch or listen to Korean cultural contents, to 
what extent they do it, and why they do. The next section is devoted to 
exploring these aspects of Hallyu through analysis of survey data.
Size and Demographic Characteristics of Hallyu Audiences
The Hallyu phenomenon has usually been described by either the 
viewership ratings of Korean television dramas, media events such as fan 
meetings or media reports regarding Hallyu-related news and events. But the 
scope and breadth of Hallyu in a country or a region as a whole have rarely 
been investigated in earnest, except for speculative reports or impressive 
descriptions. The 2008 EASS data may provide a reliable set of data at this 
juncture for this purpose.
Table 8 shows how many people watch Korean television dramas and 
how often they watch in the three East Asian countries of China, Japan, and 
Taiwan. Among the three countries, Chinese audiences watch Korean 
television dramas most, followed by Taiwan and Japan. According to the 
same table, 11.1 percent of the Chinese sample view Korean dramas often, 
28.8 percent sometimes, and 28.8 percent seldom, while 31.3 percent do not 
watch them at all. Thus, it is safe to say that about 40 percent of the Chinese 
people are Hallyu fans. For the Taiwanese sample, almost the same 
proportion (31.8 percent) as that of the Chinese sample does not watch 
Korean dramas at all. But a little more than 30 percent of the Taiwanese 
sample may be regarded as part of Hallyu, fewer than the Chinese 
counterpart. Even fewer Japanese turn out to be fans of Korean television 
dramas. More than half of the Japanese sample responded that they do not 
watch Korean television dramas at all. Only 4.1 percent of them watch them 
often and 19.2 percent sometimes. 
Thus, if we define Hallyu fans as people who watch Korean television 
dramas often or sometimes, about one third of the East Asian population 
may be dubbed Hallyu fans. This survey data also reveal that there are clear 
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differences among the three countries in terms of the scope and breadth of 
Hallyu. Hallyu seems to be the most widespread and visible in China, 
followed by Taiwan and Japan. The distance between Japan on the one hand 
and China and Taiwan on the other hand is greater than that between China 
and Taiwan. This is, of course, only partial evidence for Hallyu in East Asia, 
but data clearly indicate that Hallyu is alive in East Asia and that there are 
visible variations among receiving countries. 
The survey data analyzed here cannot answer the question of whether 
Hallyu has grown or withered in East Asia since its inception in the late 
1990s. Increase in export of Korean broadcasting programs as shown in table 
4 does provide a partial answer to this question: Hallyu has indeed grown, 
but the growth rate has shrunk considerably in recent period, cautioning us 
against expecting an overly optimistic future for Hallyu in East Asia.
Who are the audiences of Korean television dramas? Cultural theories 
suggest that demographic variables are usually related to cultural tastes. In 
the case of Hallyu, women, more than men, in general are more likely drawn 
to Korean dramas, according to previous studies. On the other hand, ages of 
audiences vary, depending on the characteristics of a particular drama; they 
also vary among countries. In fact, the 2008 EASS survey reveals that there 
are more female audiences of Korean television dramas than male audiences 
in all three East Asian countries (see table 8). In China, a little more than half 
of the female sample watches Korean dramas often or sometimes, in contrast 
to 28 percent of the male sample. Likewise, the proportion of Taiwanese 
female audience is about twice that of male (44.3 percent versus 21.6 
percent). Japan is not an exception; 28.3 percent of the female respondents 
turned out to be Hallyu fans, as compared to 17.4 percent of their male 
counterpart.
Unlike gender, the age pattern of Korean drama fans is not uniform 
among the three countries. In China, for example, a clear age pattern can be 
detected; the younger a Chinese, the more likely s/he is a consumer of Korean 
popular culture. As seen in table 8, 59.4 percent of Chinese who are younger 
than 30 watch Korean dramas often or sometimes, in contrast to 21 percent 
of those over 60. In contrast, more than half of older Chinese who are 60 or 
over never watch Korean television dramas, while the same is true of only 
14.8 percent of young Chinese under 30. Taiwanese fans of Korean dramas 
are little older than those in China. More than 38 percent of the Taiwanese 
sample in their 30s and 40s and 36 percent of those under 30 may be 
classified as Hallyu fans, whereas only 19.7 percent of older Taiwanese aged 
60 or over watch Korean dramas often or sometimes. 
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Table 8
Frequency of Watching Korean Drama by Gender and Age Group
China
Watching K. D. Male Female Total 18-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 70+ Total
Often
   (%)
Sometimes
   (%)
Seldom
   (%)
Not at all

















































































Total 1,437 1,570 3,007 581 738 692 553 355 88 3,007
Japan
Watching K. D. Male Female Total 18-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 70+ Total
Often
   (%)
Sometimes
   (%)
Seldom
   (%)
Not at all

















































































Total 997 1,147 2,144 246 348 328 403 445 374 2,144
Taiwan
Watching K. D. Male Female Total 18-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 70+ Total
Often
   (%)
Sometimes
   (%)
Seldom
   (%)
Not at all

















































































Total 1,030 1,036 2,066 483 385 406 381 214 197 2,066
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Age pattern is not as clear in the Japanese respondents as in the Chinese 
and Taiwanese sample, however. That is, Japanese fans of Korean popular 
culture are relatively evenly distributed across age groups. But a slightly larger 
proportion of older Japanese respondents views Korean television dramas 
than their younger counterparts. Especially a higher proportion of Hallyu 
fans are in their 50s and 60s in Japan than in other age groups. For example, 
33.7 percent of the age group between 50-59 and 27.4 percent of the 60-69 
age group watch Korean dramas often or sometimes, contrasted to 15 percent 
of those under 30 and 19.3 percent of those in their 30s. 
The above analysis of the 2008 EASS survey data demonstrates that the 
three East Asian countries differ in terms of the demographic characteristics 
of Korean television drama fans. While female respondents tend to watch 
Korean dramas more often than their male counterparts in all countries, age 
groups of Hallyu fans differ among the three countries. For example, while 
those less than 30 years of age are the most ardent Hallyu fans in China, those 
in Taiwan are 30-39 and 40-49 age groups, and 50-59 age group in Japan. 
Factors for Hallyu
Two-way Analyses
Theoretical and empirical reviews of Hallyu reveal three major factors 
for Hallyu in East Asia: globalization, modernity, and proximity. These 
factors are converted into variable of globalism-nationalism, social proximity, 
and modernity-tradition for the sample survey, as described in the 
methodology section. 
The globalism-nationalism scale measures the degree to which 
respondents are open to outside or foreign political, economical, and social 
influence. It is hypothesized that the more global a person is, the more s/he 
accepts or subscribes to Hallyu. The mean scores of this scale for the three 
East Asian countries are 11.715 for Japan, 11.673 for Taiwan, and 9.750 for 
China, meaning that Japanese people are the most global, followed by Taiwan 
and China in that order. A series of two-way correlation analyses were 
conducted to see whether this globalism-nationalism scale is indeed related 
to the dependent variable, i.e., degree of watching Korean television dramas. 
Table 9 shows the results of these analyses. For China and Taiwan, these two 
variables turn out to be significantly related to each other, implying that 
globalization contributes significantly to the spread of Hallyu in these 
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countries. As previous studies indicate, audiences in China and Taiwan prefer 
modern, advanced, but “culturally proximate and politically neutral” TV 
programs (Leung 2008, p. 64) but avoid Western or Japanese popular culture 
which they feel are “ideologically threatening and emotionally unacceptable” 
(Yun 2009). Under such circumstances, Korean cultural products seem to 
meet these conditions in these countries. But for Japan, no relationship is 
found between these two variables. 
The social proximity variable measures social distance to Korea and is 
used as a proxy for cultural proximity. This variable is also a composite 
variable in the form of a scale from 0 to 3. Survey data indicate that Japanese 
people feel closest to Korea (mean = 1.979), followed by Taiwan (1.934) and 
China (1.460). Japan and Taiwan are close on this measure, while China is far 
from the other two countries. Correlation analyses between this variable and 
the dependent variable shows that they are significant in all three countries. 
This result may be interpreted as supporting the cultural proximity thesis 
regarding Hallyu with two caveats. One is that this variable is a proxy and 
hence does not exactly measure cultural proximity; the other is the possibility 
that exposure to Hallyu could have affected social distance to Korea, rather 
than the other way around. Still, social proximity can promote Hallyu in two 
ways in these countries. First, as many previous studies suggest, social 
proximity can be an initial factor for East Asian audiences to choose Korean 
products for the first time. Second, social proximity and consuming Korean 
cultural products can reinforce each other over time. In other words, 
exposure to Hallyu augments social proximity, which, in turn, increases 
consumption of Korean cultural products. 
The modernity thesis is also a powerful approach to the rise of Hallyu, 
especially in explaining Hallyu’s attraction to young Asian audiences. Existing 
studies usually emphasize the hybrid nature of Korean popular culture, 
whose forms are mainly Western but whose contents are mostly traditional. 
This particular hybrid quality of Korean popular cultural products, according 
to previous studies, appeals to young Asian audiences who have a taste for 
modern Western cultural products. But modernity and tradition are relative 
terms; one’s own popular culture could be more modern than the imported 
Korean popular culture. Thus, the relationship between the modernity 
variable and Hallyu was expected to differ among the countries with differing 
degrees of modernity. A simple correlation analysis between the two variables 
indeed supports this hypothesis. As seen in table 9, the modernity-tradition 
scale is significantly associated with the frequency of watching Korean 
television dramas in China and Taiwan, but not in Japan which is regarded to 
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be more modernized than Korea.
The two-way correlation analyses between the dependent variable and 
the three independent variables clearly indicate cross-national variations; all 
three independent variables turn out to be significant predictors of Hallyu in 
China and Taiwan, but not in Japan where only the social proximity variable 
has a significant relationship with viewership of Korean television dramas. 
Multivariate Analyses
Since independent variables in this study cannot be assumed to be 
independent from one another, multivariate analyses are necessary in order 
to detect spurious relationships. For multivariate analyses, dependent variable 
is converted into a dummy variable by combining (1) often and (2) 
sometimes into 1 and combining (3) seldom and (4) not at all into 0. A 
logistic regression analysis for the relationship between the dependent 
variable and the three independent variables, that is, globalism-nationalism, 
social proximity, and modernity-tradition, is conducted for each country, the 
results of which are shown in table 10. Among the three independent 
variables, only the social proximity variable is significantly related to 
viewership of Korean television dramas in all three countries, meaning that 
the closer one feels to Korea, the more likely s/he watches Korean television 
dramas. The globalism-nationalism variable is proved to be a significant 
predictor for Hallyu only in China and Taiwan. However, the effect of the 
modernity-tradition variable on the popularity of Korean dramas disappears 
completely in all three countries when the other two independent variables 
are controlled for. Thus, the two-way relationship between the modernity 
variable and the indicator of Hallyu turns out to be spurious. 
Since demographic variables are proven to be significantly related to 
Table 9
Correlation between Watching Korean Dramas and Each of the Three 
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Hallyu, respondents’ gender and age are included in another logistic multiple 
regression analysis as control variables (table 11). This inclusion of 
demographic variables in the analysis effectively removes the globalism-
nationalism variable and the modernity-tradition variable from the pool of 
significant independent variables in all three countries, leaving only the social 
proximity variable in the pool in addition to the two demographic variables 
which turn out to be very strong predictors of Hallyu, even after controlling 
for other independent variables. According to an estimate by Cox and Snell, 
only 4.4 percent of the total variance in the dependent variable is explained 
by the five independent variables in Japan, 13.1 percent in China, and 7.9 
percent in Taiwan.
Finally, three more variables representing respondents’ socio-economic 
status, that is, respondents’ education, working status, and subjective social 
status, are included in the regression analyses as control variables. Table 12 
reports the results of the logistic regression analysis involving eight 
independent variables. According to the table, respondents’ gender, age, 
education, working status, subjective social status, and the social proximity 
variable are all statistically significantly related to viewership of Korean 
television dramas in China. Thus, a young female Chinese who is highly 
educated, non-working, high in the subjectively evaluated status scale, and 
feels close to Korea is likely to be a Hallyu fan. The two independent variables 
of globalism-nationalism and modernity-tradition turn out to be not 
significant in accounting for Hallyu in China. 
The two demographic variables are also prominent in Japan and Taiwan. 
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But in Japan, social proximity turns out to be the most important in 
accounting for Hallyu. Other independent variables which are significantly 
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related to the dependent variables include respondents’ gender, age, and 
working status. In addition to the globalism-nationalism variable and the 
modernity-tradition variable, respondents’ working status and subjective 
social status do not significantly affect Hallyu in Japan. Unlike a typical 
Chinese fan of Hallyu, a Japanese Hallyu fan is likely to be an older working 
female who feels close to Korea. A similar pattern can be found in the 
regression analysis for Taiwan. Aside from respondents’ gender and age, only 
the social proximity variable has been proven to be significant as a variable. 
Thus, it is most likely that a typical Taiwanese who regularly watches Korean 
television dramas is a young female who feels close to Korea.
To sum up, the social proximity variable and the two demographic 
variables turn out to be significant factors for viewership of Korean television 
dramas in all three East Asian countries. Indicators of socio-economic status 
are also proven to be important in China, but not as much in Taiwan or 
Japan. There are other variations among the three countries. Demographic 
variables turn out to be important in all three countries. This is evident in the 
comparison of the three coefficients of determination (R²) in tables 10 to 12. 
For example, Cox and Snell’s R² for China in table 10 is 0.018, which means 
that the three independent variables explain 1.8 percent of the total variance 
in the dependent variable. But R² increases to 0.131 when gender and age are 
included in the equation (table 11), indicating that the two demographic 
variables alone contribute to the increase of R² by 0.113. When three socio-
economic status variables are added, the increment of R² is only .019 (table 
12). For Taiwan, corresponding R²’s are 0.016, 0.079, and 0.081, which proves 
that demographic variables have the largest share of R² increment (0.063), 
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followed by the three independent variables (0.016) and socio-economic 
variables (0.002). A similar result can be seen for Japan: Cox and Snell’s R² for 
the three independent variables is 0.018, as compared to 0.026, the increment 
made by the two demographic variables. Korean television dramas seem to 
attract mostly female audiences—young females in China and Taiwan, and 
older females in Japan (table 13). The explanatory power of these eight 
variables is weak in Japan (Cox and Snell’s R², coefficient of determination, is 
.045), as compared to that of China (0.150) and Taiwan (0.081).
Summary and Conclusion
Hallyu is certainly not a premeditated event; nor did it arise merely by 
chance. First of all, Hallyu would not have existed without the structural and 
institutional changes of the 1990s in Korea and other East Asian countries. 
Neo-liberal reforms in Korea in the 1990s led to opening its popular cultural 
market to the outside and to the participation of big corporations in the 
culture industry, which transformed the industry from a small and old-
fashioned one to a modern and competitive one. Since then, Korean popular 
culture industry has produced high-quality cultural products that have 
attracted not only domestic audiences but also foreign consumers. 
At the same time, other East Asian countries opened their domestic 
cultural markets to outside inputs. The uncomfortable relationship between 
Japan and Korea due to the former’s colonization of the latter for 35 years has 
recently eased, and the inward-looking Japanese culture industry began to 
look to outside, especially to East Asia, for possible markets. China, the 
largest socialist country, transformed its economy to a market economy in 
the 1980s and liberalized the media industry in the 1990s. Intense 
competition among the numerous television networks forced them to import 
cheap but high-quality ideologically acceptable foreign programs, of which 
Korean television programs were one of the most suitable candidates. Taiwan, 
sharing contemporary historical events with Korea such as Japanese 
colonization, ideological division of the country, military dictatorship, and 
late development, escaped from the firm grips of a dictatorial Nationalist 
government in the late 1980s and saw burgeoning television networks, 
especially cable television channels, the keen competition among which led to 
a search for cheaper and well-made programs from overseas. In addition, 
these East Asian countries share the Confucian cultural tradition, which 
originated from China, in varying degrees. 
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Against this backdrop, a few Korean television drama series such as “Dae 
Jang Geum” in China, Fire Works in Taiwan, and Winter Sonata in Japan 
ignited an explosion of popularity of Korean dramas and other popular 
cultural products in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Statistics show that 
exportation of Korean broadcasting programs has increased dramatically 
since 1996 despite the growth rate slowing down in recent years. The 
majority of the export goes to the three East Asian countries, with more than 
half going to Japan. And television dramas comprise about 90 percent of the 
total broadcasting programs. Hallyu, at least in terms of export of Korean 
broadcasting programs to East Asian countries, is well under way as late as 
2010.
However, analyses of audiences in the three East Asian countries reveal 
that there are some common factors as well as differences among them. 
Among the three factors suggested by previous studies, only social proximity 
turns out to be important for the rise of Hallyu in all three countries. The 
other two variables, globalism-nationalism and modernity-tradition, have no 
significant effect on Hallyu. As well, demographic variables (that is, gender 
and age) are closely related to viewership of Korean dramas in all of these 
East Asian countries. 
But there are differences among the countries. Females are more 
attracted to Korean popular culture than male audiences in all sample 
countries; typically, China has the youngest Hallyu fans, followed by Taiwan, 
and Japan the oldest. In addition, indicators of social status are effective in 
China in predicting Hallyu audiences, but less so in Taiwan and Japan. 
Thus, although individual indicators of globalism and modernity 
variables turn out to be spurious in accounting for Hallyu, societal levels of 
development or modernization seem to have worked at this juncture. 
Japanese fans of Hallyu are mostly middle-aged women who are attracted to 
Korean cultural products mainly because of a sense of nostalgia, not because 
these products represent the latest fashion or the most advanced style. On the 
other hand, young Chinese audiences and those with high socio-economic 
status find in Korean popular culture some elements of modern Western 
culture that they are eager to emulate and consume. Hallyu fans in Taiwan 
seem to be in-between Japan and China. They probably see Korean popular 
culture as being on par with theirs, and find certain cultural commonality 
between the two countries. Indeed, cultural and social commonalities seem 
to be crucial for the rise of Hallyu in these countries.
It should not be overlooked that the Korean popular cultural products 
exported to these countries are well-made and of high-quality, however. I 
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think the quality of the products itself is important in accounting for the 
success of Hallyu, because, unlike economic or material goods that are 
necessary for survival, cultural products are a kind of luxury goods, i.e., 
goods for leisure that people can live without. Cheap, low-quality programs 
may be easier to import, but they cannot survivefor long. Korean popular 
culture produced recently, at least after the mid-1990s, differ greatly in terms 
of quality to the ones produced before then.
This is evident in the recent evolution of Hallyu. Beginning from the 
second decade of the new millennium, Hallyu is expanding or evolving into a 
new or second stage, where Korean pop songs (so-called K-pop) are gaining 
explosive popularity not only in East Asia but also in Europe and America. 
The episode of May 2011 in Paris, described in footnote 3, is a good example. 
Since then, K-pop stars are performing all over the world,7 and their songs 
rank among the top in international markets. 
Compared to the first stage in which Korean television dramas were the 
chief promoter of Hallyu, this second stage distinguishes itself in several 
respects.8 First of all, most K-pop stars including the so-called idol groups are 
not accidentally discovered; they have been systematically selected and 
trained for a long time, sometimes for more than 10 years, by entertainment 
management firms. Secondly, their training and songs target international 
audiences from the first, not just the domestic market. In the course of their 
training, they learn foreign languages and dancing from international 
trainers, and their songs are composed by a group of international 
composers. Thirdly, management firms that are responsible for the initial 
selection, training, and marketing of stars adopt a systematic and scientific 
management system with careful planning in order to reduce the uncertainty 
of the cultural market. Finally, new communication networks, such as social 
networking services, become more effective and efficient in disseminating 
information, knowledge, and news on popular culture than the traditional 
media such as television, newspaper, and radio. This is because the latter is 
mostly controlled by commercial interests as opposed to the former 
representing mostly personal tastes and interests. 
7 A group of Korean singers belonging to SM Entertainment recently completed a successful 
world-wide tour, performing in Seoul, Shanghai, Tokyo, Los Angeles, Paris, and New York. The Last 
performance was on October 23, 2011 in New York. Madison Square Garden; its 15,000 seats were 
sold out within two weeks (Chosun ilbo, October 25, 2011).
8 The following characteristics are evident in an interview with Mr. Sooman Lee, CEO of SM 
Entertainment Inc., the largest and most successful in this field in Korea (Chosun ilbo, October 16, 
2011). 
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The initial stage of Hallyu may be a product of circumstantial factors, at 
least in part; but more and more, it is becoming a planned one, deliberately 
geared to the tastes of international audiences. Factors found to be effective in 
East Asia in the first stage of Hallyu such as social proximity may no longer 
be effective in the second stage or in the future due to Hallyu’s wider 
reception beyond East Asia, different contents, and different media of 
dissemination. 
In a sense, Hallyu can be viewed as a product of recent capitalist 
development. It seems to be obvious that cultural approach alone cannot do 
justice to the widespread flow of Korean popular culture. Structural and 
institutional changes following neo-liberalism have lain the founding block. 
The contents of Hallyu may not be wholly traditional or uniquely Korean; it 
could be a kind of hybridity. It may have contributed to reinforcing the 
identity of East Asian popular culture, and thus, to East Asian regionalization. 
But Hallyu has not stopped at the borders of East Asia. Instead, it is spreading 
farther to other parts of the world, including Europe and America. In any 
case, its flow clearly represents a case of alternative globalization, from the 
periphery to the center, signaling a new phase in the recent history of 
globalization.
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Appendix: Factor Analyses for Two Composite Variables
Modernity-Tradition (Principal component analysis)
Component
China Japan Taiwan































Total variance explained (%) 40.691 37.553 31.459 17.850
v19.  It is not desirable to oppose an idea which the majority of people accept, even if 
it is different from one’s own.
         (1) Strongly (2) Agree (3) Somewhat (4) Neither agree (5) Somewhat
 agree                                 agree            nor disagree           disagree
        (6) Disagree (7) Strongly
               disagree
v20.  One should not express one’s complaints about others in order to have a good 
relationship with them.
v21.  When hiring someone at a private company, it would still be better to give the 
opportunity to relatives or friends even if an unacquainted person is more 
qualified.
v22.  I feel honored when people from the same hometown play an important role in 
society.
v23.  A subordinate should obey superiors’ instructions, even if s/he does not agree 
with them.
v24. It is better to let capable leaders decide everything.














Total variance explained (%) 50.600 51.992 50.485
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v85.  (Country) should limit the import of foreign products in order to protect its 
national economy.
         (1) Strongly (2) Agree (3) Somewhat (4) Neither agree (5) Somewhat 
               agree                              agree                 nor disagree         disagree
        (6) Disagree (7) Strongly
              disagree
v86.  (Country) should follow its national interests even if these would lead to 
conflicts with other nations.
v87.  Increased exposure to foreign films, music, and books is damaging our own 
culture.

